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CALCULATION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 

FRANCHISE AND ANTITRUST RELIEF 

Harold Brown* 
Legal fees are a direct coefficIent of protectIOn for the legal 
nghts of consumers and busmesspersons. These persons are often 
unwilling to exerCIse theIr legal nghts because of the prohibitIvely 
hIgh expense necessarily assocIated with legal representatIOn. 1 At 
common law the system of contmgent fees2 was adopted to con­
front the problems that accompamed the skyrocketmg cost of legal 
fees, despite the complicated ethICal problems that accompany that 
compensatIon system. 3 
The legal community has developed an array of legal aIds de­
sIgned to assIst persons of moderate l"eans. Group legal servIces, 
prepaId legal fee msurance, legal referral servIces, and legal climcs 
are desIgned to reduce the cost of litIgatIon. In additIon, class ac­
tIons4 provIde an efficIent and economICal method of litIgatIon. 
CongressIOnal concern over the economIC realitIes of legal expenses 
has been manifested m a plethora of statutes5 desIgned to award le-
Partner m the law firm of Brown, Prifti, Leighton and Cohen, Boston, Mass. 
B.A., Yale Umversity, 1936; LL.B., 1939, LL.M., 1940, Harvard Law School. 
1. For discussIOn of the economic Impact of legal costs on the mlddleclass see 
B.F CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970) (Amencan 
Bar Foundation). 
2. See MASS. SUP JUD. CT. R. 3:14. 
3. See Brown, Some Observations on Legal Fees, 24 Sw U.L. REV 565 (1970). 
4. See FED. R. CIV P 23. The class action prOVides method whereby persons 
of moderate or modest means could combme their efforts m obtammg meanIngful ac­
cess to the courts. HawaII Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) (Marshall, J.) 
Thus, the class action serves the dual purpose of proViding an accessible means of 
litigation to the plamtiff and mcreased JudiCial adminIstrative effiCiency 
Attorneys, however, have had to petition the courts for an allowance of legal fees 
paid out of the funds created through their efforts. Lmdy Bros. Builders, Inc. 
Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lmdy I), 
and Lmdy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 
F.2d 102, 118 n.12 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lmdy II). 
5. There are more than 75 federal statutes whICh authonze the award of attor­
ney fees. See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees: What IS "Reasonable"~ 
126 U PA. L. REV 281, 303 (1977) (a comprehenSive review of the attorney fee 
Issue with focus beyond the franchise Issue); Cohen, Award of Attorney Fees 
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gal fees agamst a vIOlatIon. 6 The awarding of these legal fees, how­
ever has Imposed a new burden on the JudicIary PrevIOusly 
courts were seldom mvolved m the legal fee problems of clients 
and attorneys.7 A Judge regularly assesses and appropnates legal 
compensatIOn today ThIs paper will focus on the standards and 
procedures whICh should be utilized to compute appropnate attor 
neys fee awards m complex litIgatIon such as franchIse and antI­
trust cases. 8 
Attorneys fees have a specIal Importance m franchIsmg. A 
decade ago, a leading franchIsor publicly boasted that franchIsees 
were helpless smce they could not afford the legal fees necessary to 
obtam redress. However factual that statement mIght have been, it 
IS Just as probable that the franchIsees were not aware of theIr 
nghts and were unprepared to engage m complex and costly litIga­
tion. ThIs Imposed a senous burden on the attorney asked to re­
dress the egregIOus conduct. He had to assess hIS own mtenm 
liqUIdity prospectIvely durmg the years of potentIal court actIon. 
For the undercapitalized practitIoner, the financIal burdens and 
nsks mIght be so msurmountable that representatIOn of the 
undercapitalized franchIsees would be declined. Consequently 
prosecutIon was neglected or premature settlement was accepted. 
EconomICs, m essence, dictated the merits of some cases. 9 
LegIslatIve recognitIon of economIC realitIes led to exemplary 
damages and the awarding of attorneys fees and costs agamst VIOla­
tors of antitrust laws10 and "little Federal Trade CommISSIOn 
Against the United States: The Soveretgn Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 W NEW 
ENG. L. REV 177 (1979). 
6. State legislatures have also enacted statutes which address the attorneys 
fees Issue. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 9(4) & 11 (West Cum. Supp. 
1979) (consumer protection law with mandatory double and permissive treble dam­
ages, plus an assessment for legal fees and costs). 
7 See In re Osofsky 50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (ongIn of extensive 
standards for court determination of attorneys fees). See generally A. MILLER, AT 
TORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
CENTER (1979); 3 H. NEWBURG, CLASS ACTIONS § 6924d, at 1149-50 (1976). 
8. The specific example used to illustrate the awarding of attorneys fees will 
be based on hypothetical franchise case. It IS Important to remember that In an an­
titrust suit, prevailing plaintiff IS awarded treble damages and reasonable attorneys 
fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (Clayton Antitrust Act). 
9. The analysIs of an attorney economIC solvency IS not limited to small and 
medium size law firms. Major law firms have also recogmzed the severe finanCial 
burden of contingent fee litigation In complex cases. Many firms require pnor case 
approval by an executive screemng committee before the firm will represent the cli­
ent. Such committees conSider the merits of the claim, collectability of an award, rea­
sonable assurance of partial retainer and possibility of on-gOing cost reimbursement. 
10. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). 
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(FTC) Acts. ll In 1976, Congress amended the antitrust statute m 
order to provIde for attorneys fees when only mJunctIve relief was 
obtamed. 12 
While the courts have conSIstently awarded fees, they have 
yet to achIeve monetary uniformity 13 ThIS fact IS of partIcular Im­
portance m antitrust and franchIsmg cases because of the poten­
tIally large economIC verdicts. 14 ThIs article IS desIgned to prOVIde 
gUIdance to the courts m the assessment of attorneys fees. It will 
use for its example the awarding of fees m a hypothetical franchIse 
case. 
Assume that a settlement has been achieved m a complex suit 
11. It IS typIcal for state legIslatures to parallel federal legIslation m vanous 
areas. The state acts are often referred to as little federal acts, therefore the reference 
to Little Federal Trade CommISSIOn Acts. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, 
§§ 9-11 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). 
12. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 26; 
Blum DistrIct of Columbia Nurses Ass n, [1979] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH). ~ 62,984, at 
79,597 (D.D.C. 1979). In Knutson v. Daily RevIew, Inc., the Court reduced the lode­
star attorney fee award by 25% because there had only been recovery of nommal 
damages m the distnct court. Knutson v. Daily RevIew, Inc., 936 ANTITRUST & 
TRADE REG. REp (BNA) A-25-26 (citing Knutson Daily RevIew, Inc., 468 F Supp. 
226,236 (N.D. Cal. 1979)). The court first allowed an additional 15% for the delay m 
receIpt of payment. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP (BNA) at A-26 (citing Lmdy 
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 
(3d Cir. 1976) (Lmdy II)). The statute applies to all pending cases. Alphm 
Henson, 552 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.),cert. denIed, 434 U.S. 823 (1977). 
13. "[T]he only truly consIstent thread that runs throughout federal court deCI­
sIOns on attorneys fees IS theIr almost complete mconslstency Berger, supra note 
5, at 292. ThIS same contention IS applicable to state courts as well. 
14. The awarding of attorneys fees has most often been associated with CIvil 
nghts litigation. While many of the same computations are used m both CIvil rights 
litigation and antitrust litigation, there are potential distinctions m the sIze of the 
award and the economIc mtrlcaCles of the litigation. See note 26 mfra and accompa­
nymg text. 
One of the more controversial rulings on awards m the CIvil nghts sector IS now 
under en banc reconsIderation by the Court of Appeals of the Distnct of Columbia. 
Copeland Marshall, No. 77-1351 (D.C. Cir., orally argued Oct. 9, 1979). The dis­
tnct court had reduced $206,000 request to $160,000 for 90 weeks of work m ob­
tammg $33,000 m back pay and an affirmative action plan to elimmate Job discnml­
nation. The ongmal appellate court rejected that award m favor of pnnclple of 
reImbursement to finn for its costs, plus reasonable and controllable margm for 
profit" to be calculated from an exammation of the law firm finanCIal records. 
Among the seven amICus cunae bnefs filed m the en banc reheanng, that of the 
Equal Employment Opportunity CommISSIOn complamed that the new formula de­
SIgned to reImburse lawyers at lower rates than the market value of theIr servIces, 
will be an additional deterrent (to effective pnvate enforcement) and definitely un­
dennme the congressIOnal mtent that fees be set at level to wean competent coun­
sel from other types of law practice. Nat'l L.J., Oct. 1, 1979, at 3, col. 2. Those 
groups that rely heavily on pro bono representation from large law finns complamed 
that such cooperation will dwmdle "if the finns had to expose records of mcome, 
overhead, and profits m order to Justify fee request. Id. 
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brought by a class of franchIsees agamst theIr franchIsor. IS The 
compromIse settlement encompasses a total reVisIon of the franchIse 
agreement reflectmg major Improvements m the franchIsor s poli­
CIes and practIces and a lump sum cash payment of $2.5 million. In 
addition, the settlement Immeasurably Improves the franchIsees 
workmg conditIOns m the crUCIal areas of territonal protectIon; 
standards for termmatIon, renewal, expanSIOn, and transfer; elimI­
natIon of overbeanng restnctIons; and, flexibility of marketmg prac­
tIces. The value of these mtangibles was approxImately $12.5 mil­
lion. Thus, the total settlement package amounted to $15 million. 
After settlement, the attorney makes a fee request to the court 
based upon the counsel's hours16 multIplied by the established 
hourly rate. 17 ThIS "lodestar computatIonI8 IS multIplied by a mod­
15. The same pnnclples would apply if we use an example of class of direct 
purchasers bnngmg suit agamst honzontal combmation of pnce fixers. 
In order to avoid unnecessary complications, assume that the same standards of 
evaluation would be allowed for attorneys fees from the settlement fund as would 
be charged agamst the VIOlators. In practice, there are some considerations requmng 
disparate assessment m these categones. For example, the legal fee charges agamst 
the unwilling VIOlator would be m the nature of penalty or deterrent agamst fu­
ture VIOlations. It would further reward pnvate enforcement. In the allotment of fees 
from class settlement, the fees would be mvoluntarily paid by the absent class 
members who were victims of the VIOlation. On the other hand, it would be patently 
unfair for the absent class members to obtam wmdfall benefit without any nsk ex­
posure either dunng the pendency of suit or at its conclUSIOn. In both cases, the JU­
diCial calculation of attorneys fees should be substantially alike. 
Franchisors have recogmzed the significance of JudiCial awarding of attorneys 
fees and have mcorporated them, as functional element, mto theIr system. Some 
franchisors have contractually specified that fees should be awarded for successful 
legal defense. ThiS contract provIsion has been held VOId smce it would mevitably 
chill the vigorous pnvate enforcement of the antitrust laws mandated by Congress. 
Cohen Commodore Plaza at Century 21 CondomInIUm Ass n, Inc., 368 So. 2d 613 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (encouragement of pnvate antitrust enforcement precludes 
mdemnity for legal fees for successful defense). 
Another such example has occurred m Massachusetts. In order to debilitate auto­
mobile dealers from enforcmg theIr Massachusetts Bill of Rights the automobile fac­
tones acceded to Widespread statutory amendments on condition that the legislature 
elimmate both exemplary damages and attorneys fees. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. 
ch. 93B, § 12 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The auto dealers ultimately realized that the 
clause was not deSigned to ennch counsel, but to facilitate the protection of theIr 
nghts. TheIr effort to restore attorneys fees has been vigorously opposed. See H. R. 
5244, Mass. Gen. Ct. (1979). 
For diSCUSSIOn of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights see Brown, A Bill of Rights 
fOT" Auto Dealers, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV 757 (1971). 
16. Counsel hours are those reflected m the attorney daily diary and catego­
nzed summary but not those hours spent m on-gomg speCialty research. See note 31 
Infra. 
17. The rate used IS based on the fee for legal services regularly performed by 
counsel on fixed fee rate for clients who engage hiS services on noncontingent 
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ifymg factor m order to cover the contmgent nature of the compen­
satIon, the benefits conferred on the class, the complexity of the IS­
sues, and the quality of the serVIces rendered. 19 In addition, a re­
quest IS made for expenses mcurred after the settlement and the 
tIme spent m processmg the fee application. The court has to de­
termme whether the petitioned fees are reasonable and necessary 
HistorIcally under the common fund doctrme, expenses and 
fees were awarded for legal serVIces performed m the creation of a 
fund m whICh the economIC benefits obtaIned by the plaIntiff were 
to be shared by all members of the class. 20 Since the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure did not establish prOVISIons for an award of fees 
In class actIons21 the matter was governed entirely by general eqUI­
table prInCIples. The fees were pnmarily awarded on the basIs of a 
percentage of the recovery conSIstIng of the cash and the Interpo­
lated value of the benefits conferred In kInd. 22 In the hypothetical, 
the cash value recovered was $2.5 million with the Intangible ben­
efits valued at $12.5 million. USIng a contIngent fee award23 of 20 
percent, under earlier precedents, the fee award would be $3 
million. 
basIs and regularly pay his monthly mVOlces for services and expenses. See City of 
N.Y. Darling-Delaware, 440 F Supp. 1132, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (rather than use 
of hlstoncal rates after seven years of litigation, calculation at present rates IS appro­
pnate to compensate for lost mterest and mflation"). 
18. The multiplication of hours times rates provides the basIs for economic cal­
culation of attorneys fees. Lmdy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Amencan Radiator & 
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lmdy I). 
19. ld. Courts have not always availed themselves of thiS method of computa­
tion. As one author notes, "Many courts Simply have awarded counsel flat per­
centage of the recovery Others have taken the size of the damage award mto 
consideration. See Berger, supra note 5, at 287-88 (footnotes omitted). 
20. The United States Supreme Court m Alyeska Pipeline Serv Co. v. 
Wilderness Soc y 421 U.S. 240 (1975) held that the Amencan rule whereby each 
party pay hiS own attorneys fees had several exceptions. Included m the exceptions 
was the equity power of the courts to allow attorneys fees to be awarded under the 
common fund doctnne. See also Serrano v. Pnest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 
Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977). In the current term, the Supreme Court will focus on whether 
class action attorney awards may be obtamed not only from the money recovered by 
class members, but also from the unclaimed portion of the Judgment fund. Boemg v. 
Van Gernert, 590 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2158 
(1979) (No. 78-1327) (Van Gernert IV). 
21. See note 4 supra. 
22. For collection of such cases see Arenson Board of Trade, 372 F Supp. 
1349, 1357 n.14 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
23. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was perhaps the ongmator 
of the concept that contingent factor was mandatory m order to encourage pnvate 
enforcement of legislation with strong underlymg public policy Angoff 
Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (1st Cir. 1959). 
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Led by the U S. Courts of Appeals for the Second24 and 
ThIrd25 Circuits, the calculatIon of fee awards has veered from such 
a straIght contmgent fee mechamsm. EmphasIs IS bemg placed on 
factors other than monetary results. A majority of the federal Cir­
cuits have held that tIme expended should not be used as the sole 
critenon upon whIch to base a fee award. 26 
For a sunple fee award, the cIrcuits have relied upon the 
twelve standards27 codified m the Amencan Bar ASSOCIatIOn S Code 
of ProfessIOnal Responsibility 28 Thus, courts should consIder the 
followmg m theIr determmatIOn of fee awards: 
(1) 	 [T]he tIme and labor reqmred; 
(2) 	 the novelty and difficulty of the questIon presented; 
(3) 	 the skill reqmred to perform the legal serVIces; 
(4) 	 the preclUSIOn of other employment by the attorney due to 
acceptance of the case; 
(5) 	 customary fee m the community' 
(6) 	 whether the fee IS fixed or contmgent; 
(7) 	 time limitatIons Imposed by client or cIrcumstances; 
(8) 	 the amount mvolved and the results obtamed; 
(9) 	 the expenence, reputatIon and ability of the attorney' 
(10) 	 the undesIrability of the case; 
(ll) 	the nature and length of the profeSSIOnal relatIonshIp with 
the client; [and] 
(12) 	 awards m SImilar cases. 29 
24. 	 City of Detroit Gnnnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974). 
25. LIndy Bros. Builders, Inc. Amencan Radiator & Standard Corp., 487 F.2d 
161 (3d Cir. 1973) (LIndy I). Courts have not always availed themselves of this 
method of computation. See note 19 supra. 
26. Barber Kimbrells, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978); King v. Greenblatt, 
560 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), cen. dented, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Finney v. Hutto, 548 
F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), afl'd, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); GrunIn v. International House of 
Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 127-28 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 423 U.S. 864 (1975); 
Kerr Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cen. dented, 425 
U.S. 951 (1976); Johnson V. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th 
Cir. 1974); Evans Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 187 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
In the First Circuit King Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), has been 
expanded In Souza Southworth, 564 F.2d 609, 611 (1st Cir. 1977), Reynolds 
Coomey 567 F.2d 1166, 1167 (1st Cir. 1978), and Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st 
Cir. 1979) (negation of plaIn percentage or straight hourly compensation m CIvil 
nghts litigation). 
27. Johnson GeorgIa Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(provIded the mitial case consideration for the twelve standards). See also Souza 
Southworth, 564 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1977). 
28. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DiSCIplinary Rule 2-106(b). 
For its probable ongm, see In re Osofsky, 50 F.2d 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1931). 
29. Johnson GeorgIa Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 
1974). 
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Complex class actIon litIgatIon, however, reqUIres a refined 
applicatIon of these standards. 30 InitIally the court should InqUIre 
Into the hours expended on behalf of the class. 31 ThIS should be 
done In a categonzed form shoWIng tIme allocatIon for such items 
as court appearances, research, writIng, and discovery 32 It should 
also Include classified IdentificatIon of the IndiVIduals who per 
formed the work such as partners, aSSOCIates, law clerks, and para­
legals. Hours whICh do not directly benefit the class should be con­
SIdered separately 33 Based on its own knowledge, expenence, and 
expertIse, the court should gIVe careful conSideratIon to whether 
the hours clrumed and the tasks performed were reasonable In rela­
tIon to the hme reqUIred by other attorneys to complete SImilar ac 
tIvihes. 34 
30. It IS realized that even m SImple case, the mterrelationshlp of the twelve 
standards makes computation less than SImple activity 
3l. In Keyes School Distnct No.1, Denver, Colo., 439 F Supp. 393 (D. 
Colo. 1977), school desegregation case, the fee requested for hours worked was re­
duced by the court because of duplication, madequate itemIzation, non-legal work 
and failure to prevail on all the Issues claImed. See also Parker Mathews, 411 F 
Supp. 1039 (D. D.C. 1976), afI'd sub nom. Parker Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir. 
1977); DaVIS v. Board of School Comm rs, 526 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1976). 
32. In King Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denIed, 438 U.S. 
916 (1978), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that detailed record of 
the time spent on the case and the duties performed must be submitted; bills whICh 
SImply list certam number of hours and lack specifics as to dates and the nature 
of work should be refused. Id. at 1027 
33. A pressmg Issue m thIS area IS whether to mclude the legal servIces assocI­
ated with the application for the attorneys fee award. The CIrcuits are split on thIS 
Issue. The First Circuit m Souza Southworth, 564 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1977), allowed 
recovery for the time mvolved m secunng the fee award, but added that smce the 
class was only mdirectly benefited, closer vIew will be taken of the reasonableness 
of the expense. Id. at 614. Thus, while the "lodestar amount of fees may be m­
creased by contingency factor, no multiplier should be used m fee awards litiga­
tion. Lmdy Bros. Builders, Inc. Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 
F.2d 102, 112 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lmdy II). See also Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
A second alternative would be to compensate award litigation at lower rate. 
Keyes School Distnct No.1, Denver, Colo., 439 F Supp. 393, 410 (D. Colo. 1977). 
The courts have also refused to award compensation for fee litigation. See Lmdy 
Bros. Builders, Inc. Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 
111 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lmdy 11); Boe v. Colello, 447 F Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); 
Latham Chandler, 406 F Supp. 754, 757 n.2 (N.D. Miss. 1976); Clanton v. Allied 
Chern. Corp., 416 F Supp. 39, 43 (E.D. Va. 1976). 
In determmmg whether to make an award fee for fee litigation, courts should 
recognIze that after the benefits of the class litigation have been assured, the class 
may regard counsel as an adversary rather than an ally ThIS would be even though 
the pro rata contribution of each class member to the legal fee may be modest. Thus, 
there may be reluctance on the part of class members to be supportive of counsel' 
claIm. 
34. Unreasonable or unnecessary duplicative work effort or mefficlency should 
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Mter the court has determmed the number of hours that were 
of benefit to the class, it must then determme the basIc value of 
the serVIces by fixmg a reasonable hourly rate. In so domg, it 
should consIder the nature of the servIces performed, the complex­
ity of the undertakmg, and the hourly fee charged for sImilar ser 
VIces by attorneys with SImilar skills and qualificatIOns. Different 
hourly rates should be assIgned to vanous categones of services. 35 
By multIplymg the hourly rate by the hours, the court arnves at its 
prelimmary gUIdepost, the "lodestar computation. 36 
The fee award, however should consIder other vanables be­
sIdes hours and rates m order to compensate the attorney accu­
rately Therefore, the "lodestar" computatIOn must be adjusted to 
account for the contingent nature of the undertakmg. 37 ThIS IS 
done for several reasons. First, there IS no certamty that m a class 
action suit the class will be certified or that certificatIOn will be 
retamed. 38 Second, recovery IS uncertam, especIally if success de­
pends on the advancement of umque concepts of law Thud, the 
restructunng of an eXIstmg franchIse mvolves an mfinite senes of 
vanables mcluding such diverse factors as marketmg forces, system 
capacity monetary Issues, and a workable consensus of numerous 
franchIsees and theIr adVIsors. Thus, where the court has de­
termmed that more than the "lodestar IS warranted, the award 
should be mcreased. ThIs IS done by applymg a weIghted multi ­
plier commensurate with the value whICh the court attributes to 
the contmgency and the aforementioned qualitative factors. 39 The 
result III the court' reducbon of the claimed hours. See In re Armored Car Antitrust 
Litigation, 472 F Supp. 1357 1387-91 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (fee award of $262,000 In 
$11.8 million compromise settlement, compared with total fee requests of $1,127,500, 
pnmarily because of severe duplication, together with demal of multiplier be­
cause of unexceptional quality of services and substantial reliance on pnor govern­
ment cases against Violators). 
35. The assignment of vanous rates to vanous categones may be of such com­
plex nature that such an activity IS Impractical. ThiS IS especially true when the attor­
ney rate IS general one In which the vanous categones of service have been in­
cluded and an average hourly fee schedule computed. Hourly rates would then most 
often be the amount an attorney would charge In noncontingent matter. See Lindy 
Bros. Builders, Inc. Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 
167 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lmdy I). 
36. [d. at 168. 

37 Angoff Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (1st Cir. 1959). 

38. Class certification IS conditional and subject to later decertification. FED. R. 
CIV P 23; In re Independent Gasoline Antitrust Litigation, [1979] 2 TRADE CAS. 
(CCH) ~ 62,863, at 78,993 (D. Md. 1979). 
39. ThiS multiplier IS nsk distribution bonus to the attorney It IS obVIOusly 
subjective critena and therefore should be applied after the mitial determination of 
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fees Incurred dunng the penod after the contIngency has been 
elimInated by a final and bInding settlement should not be In­
creased SInce the rIsk has been removed. 40 
Perhaps the most complex task In the determInatIon of the fee 
award IS to select the weIghted multIplier attributable to the con­
tmgent nature of the undertakmg. In its determmatIon, the court 
should consIder the probability of success at the tIme the suit was 
filed. If'a case was preceded by a litIgated decree, perhaps only a 
modest multIplier mIght be Justified. For example, a contested 
governmental CIvil or cnmInal procedure may provIde pnma faCIe 
proof of liability and, therefore, reduce the numencal value of the 
multIplier.41 Because the U S. Department of JustIce has practI­
cally abdicated its responsibility for franchIse litIgatIon,42 however, 
such precedents have been rare In the franchIse area. 
There are no definitIve gUIdelines for the establishment of the 
multIplier factor When the tnal court finds that an Increased 
award IS warranted, it should Identify the factors that warrant the 
Increase, state the multIplier bemg used, and explicate its rea­
sons. 43 In practIce, the mean weIghted multIplier used by the fed­
eral courts IS three. In exceptIonal cases, a hIgher factor IS used. 
While it IS rare to use a multIplier over three, it would usually be 
mappropnate to use a factor less than twO. 44 A factor below two, 
the "lodestar computation. ConSideration must be made, however, as to the 
mterrelationshlp of the compensatory rate to the subjective critena. If hourly com­
pensatory rates mclude the factors of nsk and case difficulty no multiplier should be 
used. See King Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir. 1977); Grumn Interna­
tional House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 128 (8th Cir. 1975); City of Detroit 
Gnnnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974). 
40. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 416 F Supp. 907, 922 & n.43 (E.D. 
Pa.1976). 
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). Under the Impact of collateral estoppel, there 
should be cases mvolvmg reliance on contested FTC proceedings and most· espe­
Cially on successful pnvate litigation against the same franchisor. See Parklane Ho­
siery Co. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979); Perry Amerada Hess Corp., 427 F Supp. 
667 (N.D. Ga. 1977). 
42. See U.S. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Amenca, No. C-79-2144 (N.D. Cal., filed 
Aug. 15, 1979) (Civil antitrust tying claim to enJoin auto factory from conditioning the 
grant of its franchise on the exclUSive purchase of replacement parts). 
43. A court' failure to specify the rationale for an Increase has been found to 
make such determmation unreViewable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Kerr 
v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 
(1976); Lmdy Bros. Builders, Inc. Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lmdy I). 
44. The follOWing IS tabulation of the hourly rates and the multipliers that 
have been applied In number of fee awards under the antitrust laws and the secun­
ties acts: 
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however may be Justified when numerous attorneys particIpated, 
when there was duplicatIOn of effort and unnecessary expenditure 
CASE 
Fned v. Utilities Leasing Corp., 
[1976-77 Transfer Binder) FED. 
SEC. L. REp. (CCH) \I 95,696, at 
90,429(E.D.Pa.1976)(securities). 
Arenson v. Board of Trade, 372 
F Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1974) 
(antitrust). 
In re Equity Funding Corp. of 
Am. Sec. Litigation, 438 F Supp. 
1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (secun­
ties). 
In re Coordinated Pretnal Pro­
ceedings In AntibIOtic Antitrust 
Actions, 410 F Supp. 680 and 
410 F Supp. 704 (D. Minn. 1975) 
(antitrust). 
Gilman v. Mohawk Data SCIen­
ces, No. 71 CIV. 4742 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 3, 1976) (securities). 
In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F 
Supp. 959 (N.D. Cal. 1974), 
afi'd, 565 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 
1977) (antitrust). 
Miller v. Fisco, [1978] FED. SEC. 
L. REp. (CCH) ~ 96,348, at 93,185 
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (securities). 
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Amer­
ICan Radiator & Standard SanI­
tary Corp., 382 F Supp. 999 
(E.D. Pa. 1974), afi'd In part, 
rev d In part, 540 F.2d 102 (3d 
Cir. 1976) (en banc) (antitrust). 
In re Master Key Antitrust Litiga­
tion, [1978]1 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 
\I 61,887, at 73,715 (D. Conn. 
1977) (antitrust). 
City of New York v. Darling­
Delaware, 440 F Supp. 1132 
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (antitrust). 
Dorey Corp. v. E.!. duPont de 
Nemours & Co., [1977] 1 TRADE 
CAS. (CCH) \I 61,313, at 71,041 











$60-$250/hr. partners + 
$4O-$I00/hr. assocIates 
$40-$200lhr. 
Up to $200/hr. 











four times hourly rate Justified; 
25% of $1 million fund 25% in­
terest earned on settlement fund 
until its distribution 
four times hourly rate up to 
$500lhr., average of $359/hr. 
three times hourly rate to lead 
counsel, two to co-counsel, one 
and half to assocIate counsel, 
one to attorneys on SIdelines; 
hlstonc hourly rates applied 
three to one times hourly rate up 
to $400lhr. 
three times hourly rate, up to 
$600lhr. 
range of multiples up to three 
times hourly rate; lead counsel 
$300/hr. 
three times hourly rate, up to 
$750lhr., $300lhr. mIXed rate 
two times hourly rate affirmed In 
award from recovenes of 
unrepresented claImants; when 
award IS added to fees from rep­
resented clients, effective multi­
ple IS In excess of three for all at­
torneys 
two times hourly rate to lead 
counsel, one and three quarters 
to co-lead counsel 
multiples up to two times hourly 
rate; currently hourly rates 
awarded across the board despite 
lower rates In earlier seven year.; 
of litigation 
two times hourly rate 
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of tIme, when the contmgency was mmImIzed by a pnor decree, or 
when the recovery represented onIv a fractIon of the total probable 
recovery m a clear vIOlatIon of the applicable law 45 
The basIs of the discussIOn thus far has been the vanables util­
Ized by the courts for the determmatIon of a fee award. Since the 
end product IS a monetary value, it IS reasonable that a calculable 
formula should be used. While the resultant monetary award will 
be a specific mathematIcal figure, the formula s numencal values, 
upon whICh the award IS predicated, are ImpreCIse. Many of the 
values will be made by the subjectIve determmatIon of the court. 
For mstance, there IS no mathematIcal formula whIch can be used 
to determme the value of the multIplier That figure IS a result of a 
court's subjectIve determmatIOn of vanables prevIOusly discussed. 
In the franchIse hypothetIcal, the total settlement was $15 mil­
lion: $12.5 million m mtangible results and $2.5 million m cash. 
The court had before it a petitIon for attorneys fees. If only one at­
torney was mvolved, the court could apply the followmg formula to 
determme the fee award: 
(H)(C)(M) + (H')(C') = FA 
While complicated at first glance, the formula IS sImple m applica­
tIon. The hours of the attorney (H) should be multIplied by the 
compensatIon of the attorney (C) m order to achIeve the "lodestar 
ThIs "lodestar would then be multIplied by the multIplier factor 
(M). If post-settlement servIces were reqUIred, the formula would 
be further developed. The same pnncIples would apply except that 
CASE NONCONTINGENT MULTIPLE OF HOURLY 
HOURLY RATES RATE AWARDED 
UPHELD 
Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. 
Beasley, 73 F.R.D. 658 (S.D.N.Y. $80-$ 1501hr. two times hourly rate 
1977) (denvative securities). 
In re Folding Carton Antitrust range of multiples, with three 
Litigation, 937 ANTITRUST & $50-$250/hr. times hourly rate for lead counsel 
TRADE REG. REP (BNA) A-32 
(N.0. Ill. 1979) (antitrust). one and one quarter times hourly 
rate for senior partner with 
HEW Corp. v. Tandy Corp., No. hourly rates rangmg from 
73-2654-F (D. Mass. Nov. 21, $30-$150/hr. $75-$150 depending upon activ­
1979) (antitrust). ity; associate compensation from 
$30-$75 depending upon activ­
ity, no multiplier used 
45. It IS clear that court would be dealing with fractional percentages if it 
used multiplier below two SInce it would have to use multiplier calculation be­
tween 1.1 and 1.9. A multiplier of one would not result In any additional compensa­
tion. 
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the admmlstratIve hours (H') and the admllllstratIve compensation 
(C') of the attorney would be used. Presumably these would differ 
from the rate charged m litigation. In additlOn, there would be no 
multiplier smce the nsk factor would be removed after settlement. 
The sum of the litigation and the admllllstratIve products would re­
sult m the attorney s fee award (FA). 46 Assummg more than one 
person worked on the case, a separate calculation for each would 
be necessary The formula for the total fee award (TFA) would be: 
TFA = FAp + FAA + FAs 
ThIS would be the fee award for partners (FAp), plus the fee award 
for assocIates (FAA)' plus the fee award for the law students or 
paralegals (F As). Each of the separate fee awards would be calcu­
lated m the same manner as m the prevlOUS example except no 
multiplier (M) would be used for the student s fee. 47 
Assume that m our hypothetical franchIse case three mdivldu­
46. The formula used IS Simplification of more complex and accurate for­
mula which could be used to calculate fee awards. The complex formula would con­
sider vanous factors such as unnecessary hours expended on the case and unreason­
able levels of computation. Thus, more accurate determination would be made by 
uSing the following: [(H - UH)(C - UC)(M)] + (H' - UH')(C' - UC')] = FA. The 
hours expended (H) would have to be reduced by the unnecessary hours expended 
(UH). The unnecessary hours might Include those spent on travel, items unrelated to 
the case or duplication of activity. See notes 31 & 32 supra. See also United Fed' of 
Postal Clerks, AFL-CIO v. United States, 61 F.R.D. 13 (D. D.C. 1973). The same 
principle would be applied to the unreasonable compensation (UC) whICh would be 
subtracted from the compensation (C). 
The multiplier (M) IS perhaps the most difficult and subjective of all factors to 
determine. The courts have used vanety of multipliers. See note 44 supra. In order 
to attract counsel willing to forego the normal compensation rate In lieu of an attor­
ney fee award, courts have compensated for the contingency nsk by application of 
multiplier, or, In some cases bonus. As Berger POints out: 

If there has been no Significant nsk there should be no adjustment. 

If the court concludes that success was more likely than not at the outset, an 

Increase In the fee award of fifty percent would be appropnate. Where the 

court concludes that the chance of success was about even at the outset, an 

Increase In the hourly rate In the range of 100 percerit appears appropnate. 

Finally, if the case appeared unlikely to succeed when Initiated, an Increase 

of the baSIC hourly rate of up to 200 percent may be Justified to compensate 

the attorney for the substantial nsk undertaken. 

Berger, supra note 5, at 326. 
The hours of post settlement administrative work (H') and the compensation for 
that time (C') would, like the litigation work, be reduced by unnecessary hours of 
administrative work expended (UH') and unreasonable compensation (UC'). Note 
that there IS no multiplier Included In thiS calculation since there IS no contingent 
nsk Involved. 
47 It IS assumed that the overhead cost of secretanal and clencal assistance IS 
subtotaled within the mdivldual hourly compensation rate charged by the firm. 
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als worked on the case: a partner, an aSSOCiate, and a law student. 
To ease the computatIon, further assume that each spent 500 hours 
of nonduplicatIve tIme on the litIgatIon portIon of the case with the 
partner spending 50 hours and the assocIate 100 hours In 
non duplicatIve post settlement admimstratIve work. The hourly 
non-contIngent compensatIon rates for a partner are assumed to be 
$250 for litIgatIon and $200 for admInIstratIve work, for an assocIate 
$150 and $100 respectively and for a law student a flat $5. For the 
sake of the problem, these rates are assumed to be appropnate and 
not mflated. 48 Based upon the difficulty of the case and the nsk In­
volved, a multIplier of 3 will be used. The separate formula for 
each of the IndivIduals will be: 
TFA = 	 FAp [(H)(C)(M) + (H')(C')] + FAA[(H)(C)(M) + 
(H')(C')] + FAs [(H)(C)]49 
InsertIng the numencal values Into the formula would result In a 
fee award of $622,500. 50 
While thIS IS consIderably less than the straIght contIngent fee 
award of $3 million, it IS certaInly more reasonable. 51 ConsIder 
however the effect of a change In the multIplier A multiplier of 4 
would result III a fee recovery of $822,500, an Illcrease of 
$200,000. 52 Thus, the courts should be cogmzant of the Impact a 
change III the multiplier will make. An Illappropnate or poorly de­
termIned multIplier could prove extremely costly to the losmg 
party and be a wmdfall to the prevailing attorney 
48. Our hypothetical law firm IS effiCient and honest. 
49. The same formula IS necessary for each mdivldual as was pnnted m note 46 
supra. The fonnula would be: 
TFA = FAp [(H - UH)(C - UC)(M) + (H' - UH')(C' - UC')] + FAp [(H ­
UH)(C -	 UC)(M) + (H' - UH')(C' - UC')] + FAs [(H - UH)(C ­
UC) + (H' - UH')(C - UC')]. 
There IS no necessity to mclude multiplier with the law student' compensa­
tion. While the salary of the student may not be subtotaled withIn the hourly com­
pensation rate of the vanous partners and associates, as were the secretanal and cler­
Ical salanes, there IS certaInly no nsk factor for the student. 
50. Usmg the formula m note 49 supra, the calculations would be as follows: 
FTA = FAp[(500 - 0)(250 - 0)(3) + (50 - 0)(200 - 0)] + FA A [(500 - 0)(150 
- 0)(3) + (100 - 0)(100 - 0)] + FAsl(500 - 0)(5 - 0)] = FAp[(125,000)(3) + 
10,000] + FA A [(75,000)(3) + 10,000] + FAs[2500] = FAp[375,000 + 10,000] 
+ FA A [225,000 + 10,000] + FAs[2500] = FAp[385,000] + FA A [235,000] + 
FAs[2500] = $622,500. 
51. It should be noted that the statutes which allow for attorneys fees premise 
that fee award as beIng reasonable. See note 5 supra. In addition, Sprogls 
United Airlines, Inc., 517 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1975) has Implied that fees should 
be proportionate to the damage recovered. While thiS IS title VII case, the same 
principle should apply to franchise cases. 
52. Calculation IS left to the reader. 
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A generous award IS needed, however, to encourage pnvate 
counsel to devote willingly the Immense amount of tIme and spe­
cIalized effort reqUIred m complex litIgatIon. Successful prosecutIon 
IS the basIc cornerstone of Congress statutory policy to encourage 
pnvate enforcement of complex commercIal law Both Congress 
and the courts have repeatedly recogmzed that public enforcement 
of laws IS not adequate. Without the generous cooperatIon of the 
pnvate attorney general, the strong public policy underlymg many 
statutes could not be achIeved. 
The overnding consIderatIon IS that the fee award be faIr to all 
the persons mvolved mcluding the class members53 and the law­
yers. On the other hand, it also must be perceIved as faIr to an m­
formed public lest it call mto questIon the mtegrity and reputatIOn 
of the legal professIOn. 54 Although these goals may appear elUSIve, 
the alternatIve should not be reliance solely upon mathematIcal cal­
culatIons. It must evoke the careful applicatIon of common sense, 
sound Judgment, and expenence: 
[UltImately the] felt necessitIes of the tIme, the prevalent moral 
and politIcal theones, mtentions of public policy avowed or un­
conscIOUS, even the prejudices whICh Judges share with theIr 
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogIsm 
m determmmg the rules by whICh men should be governed. The 
law embodies the story of a nation s development through many 
centunes, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contamed only the 
axIOms and corollanes of a book of mathematics. 55 
53. See Barron Commercial & Indus. Bank, [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH) 
~ 97,132, at 92,240 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (legal fee In class action securities case settle­
ment reduced from $325,000 to $275,000 because the class consisted mostly of re­
tired and elderly persons). 
54. Cf Blackle v. Borrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975) (class action brought 
under the federal security laws claimIng misrepresentation about the company fi­
nances). 
55. O. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1-2 (1881). 
